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I. INTRODUCTION 
Employers consider many factors when selecting among 
candidates for employment.  Often employers conduct only a brief 
review of candidates, sometimes after more extensive evaluation.  But 
they always assess candidates on limited information, evaluating them 
for apparent skills, ability, competence, personality traits, 
 
 The authors, partners at the law firm of Hunton & Williams LLP, acknowledge 
the contributions of Anna Lazarus, an associate in the firm, and Douglas Dreier, a 
2012 summer associate with the firm. 
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appearance, and past employment history, among other things.  The 
evaluation generally aims to determine whether a particular 
candidate presents either a good prospect for success or an 
unacceptable risk to the employer’s interests and the security and 
safety of customers, employees, and the public.  Evidence that the 
applicant has a history of criminal misconduct that he might repeat 
while employed is one factor that employers often consider.1 
There are solid business reasons to consider this history.  
Criminological studies demonstrate that nothing predicts future 
criminal activity more accurately than a history of past criminal 
activity.2  An employer’s concern about loss of business assets or 
danger to persons exposed to its employees is well justified.  Failure 
to identify and assess possible risks may expose the business to 
ruinous theft or result in serious harm to others.  The question 
examined in this Article is whether an employer’s consideration of 
criminal history should be subject to challenge through claims of 
racially discriminatory impact under the civil rights laws even though 
the employer uniformly considers the criminal history of all 
applicants and applies its judgments similarly among protected 
groups.  This is a timely issue.  The United States Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (EEOC or “the Commission”) and the 
Departments of Labor and Justice have taken the position that using 
criminal history as a selection standard has a disparate impact on 
African Americans and Hispanics.3  To avoid liability, an employer 
 
 1  Current reports indicate that roughly fifty percent of employers either always 
or sometimes perform some kind of review for past convictions.  Harry J. Holzer, 
Steven Raphael & Michael A. Stoll, Perceived Criminality, Criminal Background Checks, 
and the Racial Hiring Practices of Employers, 49 J.L. & ECON. 451, 454 (2006).  The 
choice of the masculine pronoun is intentional to reflect the perception that males 
are more commonly affected by such investigations.  Accord Complaint, EEOC v. 
Freeman, No. 8:09-CV-02573 (D. Md. Sept. 30, 2009) (claiming that screening for 
criminal convictions discriminates against men, who are disproportionately over-
represented in criminal convictions). 
 2  See Alfred Blumstein & Kiminori Nakamura, “Redemption” in an Era of 
Widespread Criminal Background Checks, 263 NAT’L INST. OF JUST. J. 10, 12–13 (2009) 
(contrasting those first arrested at sixteen with those first arrested at eighteen) 
[hereinafter “Redemption” in an Era of Widespread Criminal Background Checks]; Shawn 
D. Bushway, Paul Nieuwbeerta & Arjan Blokland, The Predictive Value of Criminal 
Background Checks: Do Age and Criminal History Affect Time to Redemption?, 49 
CRIMINOLOGY 27, 28, 43 (2011); see also ALFRED BLUMSTEIN & KIMINORI NAKAMURA, 
FINAL REPORT SUBMITTED TO THE NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, EXTENSION OF CURRENT 
ESTIMATES OF REDEMPTION TIMES: ROBUSTNESS TESTING, OUT-OF-STATE ARRESTS, AND 
RADICAL DIFFERENCES 23 n.21 (2012) (“Prior criminal history is an important 
predictor of recidivism and is associated with a higher risk of recidivism.”). 
 3  AMY SOLOMON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BRIEFING ON THE IMPACT OF CRIMINAL 
BACKGROUND CHECKS AND THE EEOC’S CONVICTION RECORDS POLICY ON THE 
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may have to prove the “business necessity” for applying this standard 
to those applicants under the antidiscrimination laws.4 
This Article explores the government’s application of the 
disparate impact theory of discrimination to employment decisions 
that turn on an applicant’s conviction for certain crimes.  Part II 
surveys the common law principle that holds employers liable for 
injuries to others where they have been negligent in failing to 
investigate or, having investigated, failing to take actions sufficient to 
the discharge of a common law duty of care to those others. 
Part III reviews the development of the disparate impact theory 
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended and as 
applied to facially neutral standards for employment selection that 
tend to perpetuate the effects of past discrimination.  In addition, 
Part III examines the cases involving challenges to the use of criminal 
convictions as a standard for selection that have been decided under 
the disparate impact theory. 
In Part IV, this Article reviews recent guidance from the EEOC 
to its field offices5 that would apply generalized national 
incarceration rates to support findings of discrimination anywhere 
that an employer rejects an African American or Hispanic candidate 
for having committed crimes that are disclosed or discovered during 
the application process. 
Part V argues that this  agency policy sweeps too broadly 
because, in its rush to require employers to prove the “necessity” of 
their standards, it fails to consider the differences in the labor market 
as well as in the relevant standards for evaluation of “necessity.”6  
Moreover, the policy may require too much under the judicially 
accepted standards for these cases decided under a disparate impact 
 
EMPLOYMENT OF BLACK AND HISPANIC WORKERS 2 (2012); Training and Employment 
Guidance Letter No. 31-11, U.S. Dep’t of Labor (May 25, 2012), available at 
http://wdr.doleta.gov/directives/attach/TEGL/TEGL_31_11_acc.pdf.  Under 
current law, a practice is permissible if it is “job related . . . and consistent with 
business necessity.”  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2006).  As this Article will show, this has 
been held to be a lesser standard than “necessity” as commonly understood.  See, e.g., 
Donnelly v. R.I. Bd. of Governors for Higher Educ., 929 F. Supp. 583, 593 (D.R.I. 
1996), aff’d, 110 F.3d 2 (1st Cir. 1997). 
 4  Donnelly, 110 F.3d at 2. 
 5  See EEOC Enforcement Guidance No. 915.002 (2012), available at 
http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/upload/arrest_conviction.pdf.  Although the 
Guidance does not address gender, the EEOC has nonetheless filed suit on the basis 
of the alleged disparate impact that background checks have on male employees.  
Complaint at 4, EEOC v. Freeman, No. 8:09-CV-02573 (D. Md. Sept. 30, 2009). 
 6  “Necessity” is in quotes to denote that it is a term of art in this context.  As will 
become clear, the standard Congress has adopted is, in part, well short of actual 
necessity. 
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theory. 
II. EMPLOYER LIABILITY FOR NEGLIGENT HIRING 
Like every other person and entity, an employer has a common 
law duty of care to prevent foreseeable harm to others.7  In the 
employment context, the Restatement of the Law of Torts describes 
that duty as follows: 
A master is under a duty to exercise reasonable care so to 
control his servant while acting outside the scope of his 
employment as to prevent him from intentionally harming 
others or from so conducting himself as to create an 
unreasonable risk of bodily harm to them, if 
(a) the servant 
(i) is upon the premises in possession of the 
master or upon which the servant is privileged to 
enter only as his servant, or 
(ii) is using a chattel of the master, and 
(b) the master 
(i) knows or has reason to know that he has the 
ability to control his servant, and 
(ii) knows or should know of the necessity and 
opportunity for exercising such control.8 
That duty is nowhere more chillingly illustrated than in the 
Florida case of Tallahassee Furniture Co. v. Harrison.9  As described in 
that opinion, John Allen Turner did odd jobs for Tallahassee 
Furniture for several months.10  He had a history of violent assaultive 
behavior, including an incident in which he stabbed his wife in the 
face.11  He had been using heroin and cocaine with coworkers during 
this time and had violated his probation from an earlier conviction.12  
The company hired Turner for an open delivery driver position.13  It 
made no inquiry into Turner’s publicly available criminal conviction 
history, however, and did not even require him to fill out an 
application for employment that would have called for identification 
of that history.14 
 
 7  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283. 
 8  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: DUTY OF MASTER TO CONTROL CONDUCT OF 
SERVANT § 317 (1965).   
 9  583 So.2d 744 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991). 
 10  Id. at 748. 
 11  Id. at 749. 
 12  Id. 
 13  Id. at 748. 
 14  Id. 
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Elizabeth Harrison was a student at Florida State University.15  
She purchased a couch from Tallahassee Furniture and Turner was 
in the crew that delivered it to her apartment.16  He also helped by 
moving furniture around for her during the delivery.17  Apparently in 
appreciation, Harrison gave him a television set that she no longer 
wanted.18  Turner accepted the gift and took it away with him.19 
Weeks later, on New Year’s Day, Turner returned to Harrison’s 
apartment, claiming that the company required him to produce a 
receipt for the television.20  She left the door ajar and began to 
prepare a receipt for him.21  Meanwhile, he asked to use her 
bathroom and she agreed.22  Turner then entered the apartment, 
took a knife from her kitchen, and brutally assaulted Harrison, 
causing her serious and permanent injuries.23 
Harrison sued Tallahassee Furniture for negligent hiring and 
obtained a verdict of almost $2 million in compensatory and punitive 
damages that the company appealed.24  In an extensive discussion of 
the evidence and the common law of negligent hiring, the appellate 
court upheld the verdict in full.25  The court relied in part on expert 
testimony about security and criminological issues that indicated that 
a history of misconduct that was available for review at the time of 
Turner’s hiring should and would have alerted the company that 
hiring Turner presented a risk to the company’s customers, including 
Harrison.26 
Similar cases abound across the United States.27 
 
 15  Harrison, 583 So.2d at 748. 
 16  Id. 
 17  Id. 
 18  Id. 
 19  Id. 
 20  Id. 
 21  Harrison, 583 So.2d at 748. 
 22  Id. 
 23  Id. at 747, 748. 
 24  Id. at 748. 
 25  Id. at 750–63. 
 26  Id. at 759–63, 
 27  See, e.g., Blair v. Defender Servs., Inc., 386 F.3d 623, 628–30 (4th Cir. 2004) 
(vacating summary judgment for employer on plaintiff’s claims of negligent hiring 
and negligent retention because employer failed to conduct a criminal background 
check of employee, and therefore, a question of fact remained concerning whether 
employer should have known of employee’s past violent conduct); Beverly v. 
Diamond Transp. Servs., Inc., 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 11136, at *1–3 (4th Cir. June 1, 
1999) (affirming jury’s $3 million award to rape victim after finding that 
transportation service was negligent in hiring a convicted felon without conducting a 
background check; employee driver who raped victim had past convictions for 
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Criminology experts report that a significant predictor of future 
criminal behavior is a record of past behavior, particularly in 
combination with a person’s age at the time of conviction as well as 
his age at subsequent release from incarceration.28  Given both the 
ready availability of Internet sources and increasingly available 
resources for prospective employers to make inquiry, it seems clear 
that failure to discover the criminal history of someone like Turner 
presents a question for a jury in a negligence case: whether the 
employer discharged its duty of care to the customer, members of the 
public, or other employees when it failed to check or, having 
checked, disregarded the predictive value of the record.29  
Considered either from the perspective of affirmative duty or as a 
matter of risk prevention, these cases drive many employers to make a 
 
conspiracy to commit robbery, felony robbery, possession of marijuana, reckless 
driving, and concealment of a firearm); Becken v. Manpower, Inc., 532 F.2d 56, 57 
(7th Cir. 1976) (finding that a question of fact existed as to whether employment 
agency was negligent in hiring employee who stole from client when the employment 
agency failed to conduct background checks on employees who were paroled 
felons); C.R. v. Tenet Healthcare Corp., 87 Cal. Rptr. 3d 424, 427–28 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2009) (reversing dismissal of employer negligence claims where the allegations in 
the complaint averred, inter alia, that the defendant employer failed to conduct a 
background check, which would have revealed employee’s sex crime history); Evan F. 
v. Hughson United Methodist Church, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 748, 758 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) 
(“[A]n employer can be held liable for negligent hiring if he knows the employee is 
unfit, or has reason to believe the employee is unfit or fails to use reasonable care to 
discover the employee’s unfitness before hiring him.”); TGM Ashley Lakes, Inc. v. 
Jennings, 590 S.E.2d 807, 807–08 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003) (affirming jury verdict of 
negligence where the employer did not conduct a background check); Harrington v. 
La. State Bd. of Elementary and Secondary Educ., 714 So. 2d 845, 847–48 (La. Ct. 
App. 1998) (finding the school board liable for negligent hiring where it failed to 
conduct a background check on a professor, who ultimately raped a female student, 
which would have revealed that the professor had prior convictions and served jail 
time for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, theft, and interstate 
transportation of forged securities); Hines v. Aandahl Constr. Co., LLC, 2006 Minn. 
App. Unpub. LEXIS 1033, at *1–2 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 12, 2006) (affirming lower 
court’s holding that a contractor was negligent in hiring a painter whose employees 
robbed and assaulted the homeowners; the contractor knew that the painter had 
three prior felony convictions for burglary, was a drug addict, and had admitted to 
theft from another homeowner, but failed to conduct a background check and 
assigned painter to jobs that gave him access to private residences); Lingar v. Live-In 
Companions, Inc., 692 A.2d 61, 62–63 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997) (finding a 
genuine issue of fact as to plaintiffs’ claims for negligent hiring against home health 
care company whose employee stole from disabled patient and abandoned him; 
employer failed to conduct background check on employee who lied about prior 
convictions, which included possession and distribution of cocaine, shoplifting, 
trespassing, and receipt of stolen property); Rucshner v. ADT Sec. Sys., Inc., 204 P.3d 
271, 275–82 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009) (absence of employer background check could in 
form jury verdict for victim that failure caused injury to victim). 
 28  See supra note 2. 
 29  See Harrison, 583 So.2d at 740; see cases cited supra note 27. 
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careful search before hiring.30 
The same issues apply for an employer that is concerned about 
avoiding risk of theft or misappropriation from the business or from 
customers.  An employer has a legitimate interest in avoiding future 
harm to itself and its customers from dishonesty, theft, and fraud.  
The employer takes an unnecessary risk if no inquiry precedes the 
hiring of an individual who has a record of misconduct in the past.  It 
has been reported that companies lose about $52 billion a year to 
employee theft,31 and it cannot be denied that inquiring into 
potential employees’ criminal histories, thereby avoiding harm to 
customers and loss to the employer, addresses legitimate business 
interests for employers. 
III. AN OVERVIEW OF TITLE VII 
Cases like Green v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co.,32 in which 
plaintiffs bring suits against employers for considering criminal 
records in employment decisions, arise under Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 or parallel state laws.  In 1964, Congress enacted 
Title VII to prevent certain types of discrimination in the workplace.33  
Although it swept more broadly, there is no doubt that the principal 
focus of the Act was to correct the history of overt racial 
discrimination in the United States.34  Title VII declares that “[i]t 
shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to fail or 
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to 
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, 
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such 
individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin[.]”35  This 
language clearly prohibits disparate treatment of persons because of 
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, but in Griggs v. Duke 
Power Co., the Supreme Court ultimately found that Title VII 
prohibits not just policies that have the “purpose” but also those that 
 
 30  See EEOC Enforcement Guidance No. 915.002, supra note 5, at III.B; Holzer, 
Raphael & Stoll, supra note 1, at 451; see also Harry J. Holzer, Statement before 
United States Commission on Civil Rights at n.2 (Dec. 7, 2012) (“Employers tend to 
fear legal liability for theft or bodily harm done to coworkers or customers by 
previous offenders in a small number of well-known cases.”).  
 31  Larry Reynolds, Pay Policies Can Prevent Employee Theft, Fraud, Studies Show, 
BLOOMBERG BNA (Nov. 28, 2012), http://www.bna.com/pay-policies-prevent-
n17179871204/. 
 32  549 F.2d 1158 (8th Cir. 1977). 
 33  Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 2, 28 & 42 U.S.C.). 
 34  H.R. 914, 88th Cong. (1963). 
 35  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012). 
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have the “effect” of discriminating against any of these demographic 
classes.36 
In Griggs, the Court confirmed that Title VII prohibited practices 
or policies that, although facially neutral, had a disparate impact by 
race, or other protected classes, and were not job related.37  The 
Court considered section 703(h) of Title VII, which prohibits the use 
of ability tests where they are “designed, intended or used to 
discriminate[.]”38  It seized upon the words “used to discriminate” 
and, although it did not conduct a textual analysis, it inferred that 
the phrase “used to” denotes a lesser standard than does “designed” 
or “intended.”39  The Court then focused on the legislative history of 
the statute, particularly the defeat of Senator John Tower’s proposed 
amendment that would have explicitly authorized “professionally 
developed ability tests.”40  Even though reliance on rejected 
amendments is a disfavored means of statutory interpretation,41 the 
Court nevertheless used that rejection to hold that Congress 
intended to forbid the use of ability tests, at least those that 
perpetuated the effects of past discrimination “unless they are 
demonstrably a reasonable measure of job performance.”42  Over the 
years, Griggs’ applicability expanded beyond ability tests and 
educational requirements to include any employment policy that has 
a disparate impact upon race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.43 
The Supreme Court inferred Congress’s intent to address 
unintentional discrimination in 1971 with its decision in Griggs.  
Congress eventually codified this approach in 1991.44  Title VII now 
provides that it is unlawful for an employer to “use[] a particular 
employment practice that causes a disparate impact on the basis of 
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin [if] the respondent fails 
to demonstrate that the challenged practice is job related for the 
position in question and consistent with business necessity[.]”45  As 
 
 36  401 U.S. 424, 436 (1971). 
 37  Id. 
 38  Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703(h); Griggs, 401 U.S. at 433.  
 39  Griggs, 401 U.S. at 433–34 (emphasis in original). 
 40  Id. at 435. 
 41  Aldridge v. Williams, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 9, 24 (1844). 
 42  Griggs, 401 U.S. at 436. 
 43  See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) (discussing gender 
discrimination where a prison guard was rejected for failure to meet weight 
requirements). 
 44  Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006)).   
 45  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2006). 
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part of a political compromise, however, Congress also agreed not to 
define the phrase “job related . . . and consistent with business 
necessity” with any more clarity or precision.46  Congress thus left that 
definition to the courts to develop case-by-case. 
A. The Birth of Disparate Impact Theory 
Originally, the EEOC conceived of disparate impact theory as a 
“potential alternative approach” to the standard discrimination case.47  
The EEOC’s decision was strategic—EEOC wanted employers to work 
with the Agency, and knew that achieving employer compliance 
would be easier if, instead of stigmatizing employers by requiring a 
showing of intentional discrimination, it focused on issues that 
employers were less likely to resist.48  The theory was that progress in 
addressing headwinds to equal opportunity was more important than 
assignment of motives that might attract more vigorous resistance.49 
Griggs was not the first case in which a federal court approved of 
disparate impact theory.  One of the first cases to hold in favor of a 
plaintiff on a disparate impact claim was a case involving an 
employer’s refusal to hire an applicant because of his arrest record.50  
In that case, however, as was typical of the pre-Griggs disparate impact 
cases,51 the court was concerned about the likelihood that the 
employer had intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff 
because of his race and the analysis proceeded on that hypothesis.52 
 
 46  See, e.g., Donnelly, 929 F. Supp. at 593, aff’d, 110 F.3d 2 (1st Cir. 1997). 
 47  Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53 UCLA L. REV. 701, 
715 (2006).  
 48  Id. at 715–16. 
 49  Id. at 716. 
 50  See Gregory v. Litton Sys., Inc., 316 F. Supp. 401, 403 (C.D. Cal. 1970), modified, 
472 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1972). In Gregory v. Litton Systems, Inc., an employer revoked a 
job offer to a black man who “had previously been arrested on fourteen different 
occasions in situations other than minor traffic incidents,” but who “had never been 
convicted of any criminal offense.”  Id. at 402.  The court held in favor of the plaintiff 
because “[t]here [was] no evidence to support a claim that persons who have 
suffered no criminal convictions but have been arrested on a number of occasions 
can be expected, when employed, to perform less efficiently or less honestly than 
other employees.”  Id.  Considering nationwide arrest statistics, “Negroes are arrested 
substantially more frequently than whites in proportion to their numbers.”  Id. at 
403.  Thus, “the possible use of [arrest] information as an illegally discriminatory 
basis for rejection is so great and so likely, that, in order to effectuate the policies of 
the Civil Rights Act, [the employer] should be restrained from obtaining such 
information.”  Id. 
 51  See generally Susan Carle, A Social Movement History of Title VII Disparate Impact 
Analysis, 63 FLA. L. REV. 251, 292–94 (2011) (discussing the pre-Griggs disparate 
impact cases). 
 52  See supra note 50. 
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When Griggs reached the Supreme Court, disparate impact 
doctrine was relatively well established in the lower courts.53  
Therefore, when the Court held in Griggs that “Congress directed the 
thrust of the Act to the consequences of employment practices, not 
simply the motivation,”54 it was not giving birth to a new theory.  
Rather, it was following a progression, and in doing so, it held that 
Title VII forbids the use of employment tests that are discriminatory 
in effect, unless the employer meets “the burden of showing that any 
given requirement [has] . . . a manifest relationship to the 
employment in question.”55  The Court did not have occasion in 
Griggs to consider the likely reach of this theory.  It simply set the 
standard for later courts to apply. 
The Griggs Court held that neutral policies with discriminatory 
effects must be “related to job performance” and that the 
“touchstone is business necessity.”56  But without a statutory text to 
apply, the definition of that phrase evolved in later decisions.  In 
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,57 the Court held that tests with adverse 
impact are impermissible “unless shown, by professionally acceptable 
methods, to be predictive of or significantly correlated with 
important elements of work behavior which comprise or are relevant 
to the job or jobs for which candidates are being evaluated.”58  Then 
in Dothard v. Rawlinson,59 the Court stated that a discriminatory 
employment practice is permissible only if it is “necessary to safe and 
efficient job performance . . . . .”60  The appropriate standard seemed 
to vary with the facts of individual cases. 
B. The Narrowing of Disparate Impact Theory 
In 1979, in New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer,61 the Court 
limited the disparate impact theory due to its considerations of 
employer exigency.  Its decision in Beazer may foreshadow its 
treatment of background checks that can reveal prior criminal 
behavior.62  At issue in Beazer was the Transit Authority’s general 
 
 53  See Selmi, supra note 47, at 717 (“At the time it arose, the Griggs case fit easily 
within the developing case law.”).   
 54  Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971) (emphasis in original).   
 55  Id. 
 56  Id. at 431. 
 57  422 U.S. 405 (1975). 
 58  Id. at 431. 
 59  433 U.S. 321 (1977). 
 60  Id. at 331 n.14.  
 61  440 U.S. 568 (1979). 
 62  See Linda Lye, Comment, Title VII’s Tangled Tale: The Erosion and Confusion of 
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policy against employing people who were currently using narcotic 
drugs, including methadone.63  Even though only twenty-five percent 
of the Transit Authority’s employees were in positions that involved a 
risk of danger to themselves or to the public, the Court held without 
extensive analysis that the narcotics rule and its application to 
methadone users was “job related” for all employees.64  The 
employer’s concerns about safety and efficiency were legitimate 
concerns, which justified the exclusion of drug users.65  The Court 
considered this policy to be sufficiently job related and necessary 
where it “bears a ‘manifest relationship to the employment in 
question.’”66 
Over the next few years, as the composition of the Supreme 
Court changed, it narrowed disparate impact theory even further.  
Ultimately, in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,67 the Court 
significantly increased the burden for plaintiffs to meet the 
applicable prima facie standard.68  Wards Cove held that disparate 
impact plaintiffs must: (1) prove their claims with statistics tailored to 
the relevant labor market;69 (2) identify a specific employment 
practice alleged to cause the disparity;70 and (3) prove causation.71  
The Court also added to the evolving “business necessity” 
jurisprudence.  Necessity involves a determination of whether the 
practice at issue “serves, in a significant way, the legitimate 
employment goals of the employer.”72  More important, as far as 
Congress was later concerned, the Court held that the burden of 
persuasion was on the plaintiff to show that a given policy was not 
justified by business necessity.73  By 1989, however, the Court had 
come to approve a selection standard that significantly serves a 
“legitimate employment goal[] . . . .”74 
 
Disparate Impact and the Business Necessity Defense, 19 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 315, 
327–29 (1998) (discussing the Court’s treatment of the disparate impact theory in 
Beazer as confusing and erosive) .  
 63  Beazer, 440 U.S. at 571–72. 
 64  Id. at 587 n.31. 
 65  Id. 
 66  Id. (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971)). 
 67  490 U.S. 642 (1989), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 
102-166, 105 Stat. 1074. 
 68  Lye, supra note 62, at 332. 
 69  Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 650–51. 
 70  Id. at 657. 
 71  Id. at 656. 
 72  Id. at 659–60. 
 73  Id. at 660. 
 74  Id. at 659. 
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C. Congressional Reaction 
Wards Cove prompted Senator Edward Kennedy to introduce an 
amendment to Title VII in 1990 in order “to restore and strengthen 
civil rights laws that ban discrimination in employment.”75  President 
George H.W. Bush vetoed that measure.76  But the next year, 
President Bush’s appointment of former EEOC Chairman Clarence 
Thomas to the Supreme Court resulted in an unseemly confirmation 
battle.77  In the aftermath of that fight and perhaps to address 
concerns that arose in that context, Congress passed, and the 
President signed, the Civil Rights Act of 1991.78  The 1991 Act 
included a legislative override of Wards Cove.79  In codifying the 
“business necessity” standard, Congress clearly put the burden of 
persuasion on the employer to prove that a practice is job related.80  
After significant debate over the language of “business necessity” as it 
had evolved through Wards Cove, Congress took the unusual step of 
expressly depriving the courts of any legislative history that might 
inform later decisions.81 
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 clearly overrode certain features of 
Wards Cove.82  It did not, however, address the Court’s requirement 
that plaintiffs prove that an employer’s policy has a discriminatory 
impact in a relevant labor market: “[O]ne should compare the racial 
composition . . . to the relevant labor market, rather than to the 
[general] population.”83  The demographics of the fifty states are not 
 
 75  S. 2104, 101st Cong. (1990). 
 76  Steven A. Holmes, President Vetoes Bill on Job Rights; Showdown Is Set, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 23, 1990, available at  http://www.nytimes.com/1990/10/23/us/president-
vetoes-bill-on-job-rights-showdown-is-set.html. 
 77  Adam Clymer, The Thomas Nomination, Conflict Emerges Over a 2D Witness, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 11, 1991, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1991/10/11/us/the-
thomas-nomination-conflict-emerges-over-a-2d-witness.html. 
 78  Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1074 (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006)). 
 79  Civil Rights Act of 1991 at § 3; see also Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44 
(2003).   
 80  § 2000e-2(k). 
 81  See Civil Rights Act of 1991 at § 105(b) (“No statements other than the 
interpretive memorandum appearing at Vol. 137 Congressional Record S. 15276 
(daily ed. Oct. 25, 1991) shall be considered legislative history of, or relied upon in 
any way as legislative history in construing or applying, any provision of this Act that 
related to Wards Cove. . . .”).  
 82  Civil Rights Act of 1991 at § 3. 
 83  Hopkins v. Canton City Bd. of Educ., 477 Fed. Appx. 349, 358 (6th Cir. 2012) 
(emphasis in original); see also NAACP v. N. Hudson Reg’l Fire & Rescue, 665 F.3d 
464, 477 (3d Cir. 2011) (“In showing statistical disparity, the relevant comparison is 
‘between the racial composition of [the at-issue jobs] and the racial composition of 
the qualified . . . population in the relevant labor market.’”) (quoting Newark 
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uniform, and not all employment positions involve recruiting from a 
nationwide pool.  For example, considering that in 2011, 26.0% of 
Hawaiians were white, 2.0% black, and 38.5% Asian, a Hawaiian 
employer should not be measured against nationwide statistics, where 
in the same year 78.1% of Americans were white, 13.1% black, and 
5.0% Asian.84  Nationwide statistics are not a relevant measure of 
impact unless the employer hires from a national pool.  As applied to 
criminal background checks, these variations—and the absence of 
congressional agreement on what the phrase “job related and 
consistent with business necessity” means—are significant. 
Since the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, courts have 
adopted varying standards in an attempt to define “job related” and 
“consistent with business necessity.”  The following is a sample of 
some of the definitions adopted: (1) the “hiring criteria must 
effectively measure the ‘minimum qualifications for successful 
performances of the job in question,’” but the “hiring policies need 
not be perfectly tailored to be consistent with business necessity”;85 
(2) “the requirement [must have] a manifest relationship to the 
employment in question, and [be] necessary to safe and efficient job 
performance”;86 and (3) “the practice or action is necessary to 
meeting a goal that, as a matter of law, qualifies as an important 
business goal for Title VII purposes.”87 
The various efforts to arrive at definitions for “job related” and 
“consistent with business necessity” illustrate that these terms are not 
self-defining.  As of the date of this Article, however, the Supreme 
Court has denied certiorari in two cases that could have answered 
these questions,88 ensuring that lower courts will continue to struggle 
to define the ambiguous phrase until the high Court perceives the 
need to step in. 
 
Branch, NAACP v. City of Bayonne, 134 F.3d 113, 121 (3d Cir. 1998)); Lopez v. Pac. 
Mar. Ass’n, 657 F.3d 762, 767 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Plaintiff must have produced 
evidence from which a fact-finder reasonably could conclude that the one-strike rule 
results in fewer recovered drug addicts in Defendant’s employ, as compared to the 
number of qualified recovered drug addicts in the relevant labor market.”). 
 84  State & County QuickFacts: Hawaii, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Mar. 14, 2013), 
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/15000.html.   
 85  El v. S. Pa. Transp. Auth., 479 F.3d 232, 242 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting Lanning 
v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 181 F.3d 478, 488 (3d Cir. 1999)).   
 86  Smith v. City of Des Moines, 99 F.3d 1466, 1471 (8th Cir. 1996). 
 87  Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1118 (11th Cir. 1993).   
 88  City of New Haven v. Briscoe, 654 F.3d 200 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 
S.Ct. 2741 (U.S. June 11, 2012) (No. 11-1024); N. Hudson Reg’l Fire & Rescue v. 
NAACP, 665 F.3d 464 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S.Ct. 2749 (U.S. June 11, 2012). 
(No. 11-1247). 
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D. The Consideration of Criminal Records 
Over the past few decades, several courts have confronted the 
issue of whether the consideration of arrest and conviction records in 
employment decisions is a disparate impact violation of Title VII, but 
only two appellate courts have engaged in such analysis.  One of the 
leading cases is a 1975 case, Green v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co.,89 in 
which the Eighth Circuit questioned the “necessity” of an employer’s 
absolute policy of refusing to employ any person convicted of a crime 
other than a minor traffic offense in any position.90  Green involved 
the rejection of an African American Vietnam War resister for a 
clerical job.91  In Green, the court held that a “sweeping 
disqualification for employment resting solely on past behavior can 
violate Title VII where that employment practice has a 
disproportionate racial impact and rests upon a tenuous or 
insubstantial basis.”92  Under Green, to meet the requirements of 
business necessity as the Eighth Circuit understood it in 1977, an 
employment policy must not only foster safety and efficiency, but also 
be essential to that goal, and there must be no acceptable alternative 
that would accomplish that goal equally well with a lesser racial 
impact.93 
The employer in Green offered a number of reasons why its 
policy was consistent with business necessity, including: (1) fear of 
cargo theft, (2) concern over handling company funds, (3) bonding 
qualifications, (4) possible impeachment of the employee as a witness 
in proceedings where the company was a party, (5) possible liability 
for hiring persons with known violent tendencies, (6) employment 
disruption caused by recidivism, and (7) alleged lack of moral 
character of persons with convictions.94  The court, however, rejected 
the employer’s reasons because it had not empirically validated the 
policy or considered less draconian alternatives.95  The employer’s 
reasons may have served as legitimate considerations in making 
individual hiring decisions, but they did not justify an absolute ban.96 
Green announced a three-factor test to determine whether a 
criminal conviction exclusion policy meets the business necessity 
 
 89  523 F.2d 1290 (8th Cir. 1975), aff’d, 549 F.2d 1158 (8th Cir. 1977). 
 90  Id. at 1292. 
 91  Id. at 1292–93. 
 92  Id. at 1296. 
 93  Id. at 1299.  
 94  Id. at 1298. 
 95  Green, 523 F.2d at 1298. 
 96  Id. at 1298. 
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test.97  The court developed this test adopting language from a 
Southern District of Iowa decision, Butts v. Nichols.98  On Equal 
Protection grounds, Butts rejected an Iowa statute that prohibited the 
employment of convicted felons in Iowa civil service positions.99  In 
Butts, the district court invalidated the state statute because “no 
consideration [was] given to the nature and seriousness of the crime 
in relation to the job sought[;] [t]he time elapsing since the 
conviction[;] the degree of the felon’s rehabilitation[;] and the 
circumstances under which the crime was committed.”100  From this 
language, the Eighth Circuit developed the three “Green factors,” 
which purport to correlate to the applicant’s “risk of recidivism” to 
whether that risk warrants denying a job to a minority convict.101  
These three factors are discussed in detail in Part II, infra, as the 
EEOC relied on them in drafting its 2012 Guidance. 
After Green, the EEOC took the position that, for an employer to 
establish a business necessity justifying the exclusion of an individual 
from employment because of a conviction record, the employer must 
show that the offense for which the applicant or employee was 
convicted was job related.102  If the offense was not job related and the 
standard excluded more African Americans than Caucasians, then 
the employer could not consider it in employment decisions without 
violating Title VII.103  Even if the offense was determined to be job 
related, however, the employer must have examined other relevant 
factors to determine whether the conviction affected the individual’s 
ability to perform the job in a manner consistent with the safe and 
efficient operation of the employer’s business.104  These factors were: 
(1) the number of offenses and the circumstances of each offense for 
which the individual was convicted; (2) the length of time 
intervening between the conviction and the employment decision; 
(3) the individual’s employment history; and (4) the individual’s 
efforts at rehabilitation.105  These factors presumably were thought to 
correlate with the risk that the individual would recidivate.106 
 
 97  Id. at 1297.   
 98  381 F. Supp. 573 (S.D. Iowa 1974); see also Green, 523 F.2d at 1297 (citing Butts, 
381 F. Supp. at 580–81). 
 99  Id. at 69. 
 100  Butts, 381 F. Supp. at 580–81. 
 101  Cf. EEOC Enforcement Guidance No. 915.002, supra note 5, at V.B.6.b.   
 102  EEOC, COMMISSION DECISION NO. 78-35, CCH EEOC DECISIONS ¶ 6720 (1983).  
 103  Id. 
 104  Id. 
 105  Id. 
 106  Id. 
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In 1987, the EEOC incorporated the Green factors into the policy 
guidance it sent to its district offices, an interpretation that might 
receive deference from the courts under Supreme Court precedent 
requiring courts to accept an agency’s statutory interpretation when 
the agency’s interpretation is promulgated in the exercise of 
authority delegated by Congress, so long as the interpretation is 
reasonable.107  Thus, in its February 4, 1987 Policy Statement on the 
Issue of Conviction Records Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, the EEOC stated that a Title VII plaintiff must show that a given 
employment policy had an adverse impact on the protected class to 
which the plaintiff belongs.  The employer then must show that it 
“considered” the three Green factors—”(1) [t]he nature and gravity of 
the offense or offenses; (2) [t]he time that has passed since the 
conviction and/or completion of the sentence; and (3) [t]he nature 
of the job held or sought”—when it made its decision.108 
When disparate impact criminal records cases reached the 
district courts in the 1980s, the courts accepted employer 
justifications.  Typical was the decision in Moses v. Browning-Feris 
Industries of Kansas City, Inc.109  Citing Beazer for support, the District 
Court for the District of Kansas held that use of an applicant’s 
criminal past in determining qualifications for a position as a waste 
disposal worker is “justified by business necessity.”110  The court noted 
that waste disposal workers “come in close contact with the public 
many times during the day” and that they “occasionally have to enter 
a person’s yard or even the front porch in order to pick up refuse.”111  
Thus, the defendant-employer’s policy was a business necessity. 
Similarly, in EEOC v. Carolina Freight Carriers Corp.,112 the 
Southern District of Florida ruled in favor of the defendant-employer, 
stating, “Can an employer refuse to hire persons convicted of a felony 
even though it has a disparate impact on minority members?  This 
court’s answer is a firm ‘Yes’.”113  The court even jabbed at the authors 
of Green: “With all due respect to the members of the Eighth Circuit, 
 
 107  See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 845 
(1984). 
 108  EEOC, POLICY STATEMENT ON THE ISSUE OF CONVICTION RECORDS UNDER TITLE 
VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, AS AMENDED, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1982), 
available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/convict1.html.   
 109  No. 84-2334-S, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20073 (D. Kan. Sept. 22, 1986).   
 110  Id. at *8–9. 
 111  Id. at *9. 
 112  723 F. Supp. 734 (S.D. Fla. 1989). 
 113  Id. at 753. 
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their holding is ill founded.”114  District Judge Gonzales noted that 
“the honesty of a prospective employee is certainly a vital 
consideration in the hiring decision” and that “[i]f Hispanics do not 
wish to be discriminated against because they have been convicted of 
theft then, they should stop stealing.”115  The court went so far as to 
say that “[t]o hold otherwise is to stigmatize minorities by saying, in 
effect, your group is not as honest as other groups.”116  Additionally, 
the court, citing Wards Cove, criticized the EEOC for relying on 
nationwide statistics and for not “focus[ing] on the national origin 
composition of the jobs at issue and the national origin composition 
of the relevant labor market.”117 
Even in the years after the Civil Rights Act of 1991, the courts 
remain reluctant to sustain disparate impact challenges to the 
consideration of criminal convictions in employment decisions.  In 
2007, in El v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority,118 the 
Third Circuit upheld an employer’s decision under a policy not to 
hire anyone who has a record of any felony or misdemeanor 
conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude or violence.119  The 
defendant-employer had fired the plaintiff after learning of his forty-
seven-year-old conviction for second-degree murder.120  The court 
held that the employer’s policy was job related and consistent with 
business necessity, although it did so on what it acknowledged was an 
incomplete presentation in the district court.121 
In reaching its decision, the Third Circuit mentioned the Green 
factors as they appear in the EEOC’s 1987 Policy Statement.122  The 
court, however, held that “the EEOC’s Guidelines are [not] entitled 
to great deference” and are “entitled only to Skidmore deference.”123  
 
 114  Id. at 752. 
 115  Id. at 753. 
 116  Id. 
 117  Id. at 751 (emphasis added).  
 118  479 F.3d 232 (3d Cir. 2007). 
 119  Id. at 235. 
 120  Id. at 235–36. 
 121  Id. at 249.  The Third Circuit pointedly made its decision on a scant record 
supporting summary judgment for SEPTA.  Id. at 246–47.  It observed that plaintiff 
had not presented evidence that might have led to a different result.  Id. at 247. 
 122  479 F.3d at 243 (explaining that under the Skidmore standard, an agency is 
entitled to “deference in accordance with the thoroughness of its research and the 
persuasiveness of its reasoning”).   
 123  Id. at 244 (explaining that because the EEOC’s policy document did not 
substantively analyze Title VII, it was not entitled to great deference) (citing EEOC v. 
Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 257 (1991)).  Where an agency’s statutory 
interpretation does not carry the force of law, courts do not afford Chevron-style 
deference (i.e., deference to the interpretation so long as it is reasonable).  See 
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Thus, “the EEOC gets deference in accordance with the 
thoroughness of its research and the persuasiveness of its 
reasoning.”124  Because the EEOC’s 1987 Policy Statement “does not 
substantively analyze the statute,” the court treated it dismissively.125  
Despite recognizing that the Green factors are part of the EEOC’s 
1987 Policy Statement, the Third Circuit did not evaluate the 
employer’s policy against the three Green factors.126  In 2007, the 
ambiguous “business necessity” language from the 1991 amendments 
to Title VII applied, and the Third Circuit focused on whether the 
employer’s policy met the 1991 standard, which the court articulated 
as follows: “employers [must] show that a discriminatory hiring policy 
accurately—but not perfectly—ascertains an applicant’s ability to 
perform successfully the job in question.”127  Thus, to pass muster, a 
policy must attempt to distinguish between applicants who pose an 
unacceptable level of risk and those who do not.128 
The post-El courts have consistently ruled in favor of employers 
on these claims.129  Most employers have made their background 
check policies more nuanced than Missouri Pacific Railroad 
Company’s policy at issue in Green.130  Perhaps because committing a 
crime, unlike failing a test, seems like an act for which a person 
should be held responsible and perhaps because of the prospect of 
putting courts in the position of requiring employers to assume risks 
that they are in the best position to judge, the federal courts generally 
 
Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–83 (1984); 
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).   
 124  El, 479 F.3d at 243.   
 125  Id. 
 126  Id. at 244. 
 127  Id. at 242. 
 128  Id. at 245. 
 129  See, e.g., Foxworth v. Pa. State Police, 228 F. App’x 151, 158 (3d Cir. 2007); 
Naugles v. Dollar Gen., Inc., No. 4:08-CV-01943, 2010 WL 1254645, at *5 (E.D. Mo. 
Mar. 24, 2010); Fletcher v. Berkowitz Oliver Williams Shaw & Eisenbrandt, LLP, 537 
F. Supp. 2d 1028, 1030 (W.D. Mo. 2008); Clinkscale v. City of Phila., No. Civ. A. 97-
2165, 1998 WL 372138, at *2 (E.D. Pa. June 17, 1998); Williams v. Carson Pirie Scott, 
No. 92 C 5747, 1992 WL 229849, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 9, 1992).  But see Field v. Orkin 
Exterminating Co., No. Civ. A. 00-5913, 2001 WL 34368768, at *1–3 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 
30, 2001) (granting the plaintiff leave to amend her complaint to provide more 
evidence regarding whether the employer’s blanket policy against hiring persons 
with recent criminal records violated Title VII, but not deciding whether the plaintiff 
would succeed on the merits of her claim). 
 130  See Green v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 523 F.2d 1290, 1292 (8th Cir. 1975), aff’d, 549 
F.2d 1158 (8th Cir. 1977) (“The Missouri Pacific Railroad Company (MoPac) follows 
an absolute policy of refusing consideration for employment to any person convicted 
of a crime other than a minor traffic offense.”). 
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have been reluctant to interfere with such employment policies.131 
For instance, in Naugles v. Dollar General, Inc.,132 the Eastern 
District of Missouri held in favor of Dollar General against a Title VII 
plaintiff.  The court noted that: 
Dollar General is a retailer whose employees handle 
merchandise and large amounts of cash.  Its employees also 
may be in a store alone with customers or with another 
employee.  Dollar General therefore has a consistently-
applied and non-discriminatory policy of only employing 
people that either have no criminal history, or whose 
criminal history is not related by its nature to tasks 
performed by Dollar General employees, or is sufficiently 
remote in time as not to be job-related.133 
Pursuant to this neutral policy, Dollar General had rescinded its offer 
of employment to the plaintiff after a criminal background check 
revealed the plaintiff’s “numerous convictions for violent crimes, 
such as armed robbery and armed criminal action, and his recent 
release from incarceration.”134  The court granted summary judgment 
to the defendant on the issue, noting also that twelve of the store’s 
fourteen employees were African American.135 
Similarly, in Fletcher v. Berkowitz Oliver Williams Shaw & 
Eisenbrandt, LLP,136 the Western District of Missouri granted summary 
judgment to the defendant, a law firm that had discharged an 
employee after discovering his thirty-year-old rape conviction.137  The 
court first criticized the plaintiff for relying upon general, all-felony 
statistics to prove disparate impact based on race, rather than 
statistics for sex offenders more specifically.138  It then held that: “Sad 
as it may be for plaintiff, his extraordinary criminal conduct almost 
 
 131  See, e.g., Alvarez v. Royal Atl. Developers, Inc., 610 F.3d 1253, 1266 (11th Cir. 
2010) (“We do not sit as a ‘super-personnel department,’ and it is not our role to 
second-guess the wisdom of an employer’s business decisions—indeed the wisdom of 
them is irrelevant—as long as those decisions were not made with a discriminatory 
motive.  That is true no matter how medieval a firm’s practices, no matter how high-
handed its decisional process, no matter how mistaken the firm’s managers.”) 
(quotations and citations omitted); Johnson v. Weld County, 594 F.3d 1202, 1211 
(10th Cir. 2010) (“Title VII licenses us not to act as a ‘super personnel department’ 
to undo bad employment decisions; instead, it charges us to serve as a vital means for 
redressing discriminatory ones.”). 
 132  No. 4:08-CV-01943, 2010 WL 1254645 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 24, 2010). 
 133  Id. at *2–3. 
 134  Id. 
 135  Id. at *5. 
 136  537 F. Supp. 2d 1028 (W.D. Mo. 2008).  
 137  Id. at 1030. 
 138  Id. 
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thirty years ago will likely reduce his opportunities as a prospective 
employee during his employable life.  Race and sex discrimination 
laws do not impose duties on employers to overlook significant 
potential dangers, at least to employee morale.”139  Thus, the plaintiff 
in Berkowitz Oliver—like the plaintiff in every case since Green—lost his 
disparate impact case.  With only two appellate cases on the issue, the 
current judicial approach is to find that “job related and consistent 
with business necessity” is a standard that allows employers significant 
leeway when it comes to evaluating risk from prior criminal 
misconduct. 
IV. THE NEW EEOC GUIDANCE 
Following cases like Berkowitz Oliver and Dollar General, and after 
the Third Circuit’s rejection of the EEOC’s 1987 Policy Statement in 
El, the EEOC issued a new guidance on criminal conviction exclusion 
policies in 2012.140  EEOC released those policies April 25, 2012, 
entitled Guidance on the Consideration of Arrest and Conviction Records in 
Employment Decisions Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“the 
2012 Guidance”).141  The 2012 Guidance considers nationwide 
conviction and incarceration rates to justify its broad hypothesis of 
adverse impact, while paying little attention to the relevance of labor 
markets and local crime rates.142  This Guidance then focuses on the 
employer’s burden to defend and provides that employers will 
“consistently” satisfy the “job related and consistent with business 
necessity” defense when it satisfies the following requirements: 
[1] [t]he employer validates the criminal conduct screen 
for the position in question per the Uniform Guidelines on 
Employee Selection Procedures (Uniform Guidelines) 
standards . . . or [2A] [t]he employer develops a targeted 
screen considering at least . . . the three Green factors[], and 
then [2B] provides an opportunity for an individualized 
assessment for people excluded by the screen to determine 
whether the policy as applied is job related and consistent 
with business necessity.143 
 
 139  Id. at 1031.  In other contexts, employee morale or customer preferences have 
been widely rejected as a basis for a business necessity or bona fide occupational 
qualification under Title VII.  See, e.g., Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 
385, 389 (5th Cir. 1971).   
 140  See generally EEOC, supra note 3.  
 141  Id.  
 142  EEOC Enforcement Guidance No. 915.002, supra note 5, at V.A.2. 
 143  Id. at V.B.4; see also 29 C.F.R. § 1607.5 (describing the general standards for 
validity studies). 
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Even then, the policy may violate Title VII if the employer could have 
adopted an alternative policy with a lesser discriminatory impact.144  
These four parts of the EEOC Guidance are described in turn below. 
A. Validity Studies 
According to the new EEOC Guidance, employers “may rely 
upon criterion-related validity studies, content validity studies or 
construct validity studies.”145  These three types of studies are well 
defined in the Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection 
Procedures adopted in 1978.146  First, a criterion-related validity study 
consists of “empirical data demonstrating that the selection 
procedure is predictive of or significantly correlated with important 
elements of job performance.”147  Second, a content validity study 
consists of “data showing that the content of the selection procedure 
is representative of important aspects of performance on the job for 
which the candidates are to be evaluated.”148  Third, a construct 
validity study consists of “data showing that the procedure measures 
the degree to which candidates have identifiable characteristics which 
have been determined to be important in successful performance in 
the job for which the candidates are to be evaluated.”149 
The Uniform Guidelines describe  the technical standards for 
these validity studies in detail;150 however, the standards for validity 
studies set an unrealistically high bar for justifying a rejection based 
on criminal convictions.  This approach would require identification 
of a specific standard that causes impact and, if that hurdle is 
overcome, a demonstration of the job relatedness of that standard to 
a particular job.151  It is, of course, not “essential” to the job of 
delivering furniture that an applicant not have a conviction for 
violent crimes, and if imposed, the standard is not susceptible to the 
same scientific validity analysis as, for example, a pencil and paper 
test. 
The EEOC acknowledges as much: “Although there may be 
social science studies that assess whether convictions are linked to 
 
 144  Id. at V.C. 
 145  Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures (1978), 29 C.F.R. § 
1607.5(A) (2011).   
 146  § 1607. 
 147  § 1607.5(B). 
 148  Id. 
 149  Id. 
 150  § 1607.14. 
 151  Id.  
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future behaviors, traits, or conduct with workplace ramifications, and 
thereby provide a framework for validating some employment 
exclusions, such studies are rare at the time of this drafting.”152  
Validating the absence of a felony conviction—or the absence of 
indications of dishonesty or possible violence—against a set of job 
elements may be impossible.  But honesty and the absence of 
indications of a proclivity to violence are central to any employer’s 
legitimate business interests.153 
B. The Green Factors 
In the absence of a validity study, the Guidance would evaluate 
whether an employer has applied the three Green factors and then 
allowed for an individualized assessment.154  The three Green factors 
strive to determine whether an applicant’s “risk of recidivism” 
warrants denying that individual a job if he or she is a convicted 
offender.155 
The first Green factor is “the nature and gravity of the offense” or 
conduct.156  This factor correlates with Butts’ consideration of the 
“nature and seriousness of the crime in relation to the job sought.”157  
The focus of this first factor is on “the harm caused by the crime.”158  
In weighing this factor, an employer may consider the legal elements 
of the crime.159  In general, the EEOC treats misdemeanors as less 
important than felonies.160 
The second Green factor is “the time that has passed since the 
conviction and/or completion of the sentence.”161  This factor 
correlates to Butts’ consideration of “[t]he time elapsing since the 
conviction.”162  Green provides no guidance as to how much time 
matters.  Similarly, the EEOC Guidance states that determining 
 
 152  EEOC Enforcement Guidance No. 915.002, supra note 5, at V.B.5. 
 153  See, e.g., EEOC v. Carolina Freight Carriers Corp., 723 F. Supp. 734, 753 (S.D. 
Fla. 1989) (“[T]he honesty of a prospective employee is certainly a vital 
consideration in the hiring decision.”).  See also cases cited supra note 27. 
 154  Carolina Freight Carriers Corp., 723 F. Supp. at 753. 
 155 See EEOC Enforcement Guidance No. 915.002, supra note 5, at V.B.6.b 
(“Relevant and available information to make this assessment includes, for example, 
studies demonstrating how much the risk of recidivism declines over a specified 
time.”). 
 156  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 157  Butts v. Nichols, 381 F. Supp. 573, 580–81 (S.D. Ia. 1974). 
 158  EEOC Enforcement Guidance No. 915.002, supra note 5, at V.B.6.a.   
 159  Id. 
 160  Id. 
 161  Green, 549 F.2d at 1160 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 162  Butts, 381 F. Supp. at 580–81. 
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where to draw the line is a difficult decision that must “depend on 
the particular facts and circumstances of each case.”163  It counsels 
that an employer should research studies demonstrating “how much 
the risk of recidivism declines over a specified time.”164  Such studies 
have shown that a staggering 67.5% of former prisoners are re-
arrested for a felony or serious misdemeanor within three years of 
their release from prison.165  Others report different results with 
respect to an offender’s future criminal misconduct when compared 
to the general population.  But the rough (albeit debatable) 
consensus is that, in the absence of further arrests, the risk of 
recidivism becomes insignificant somewhere between seven and ten 
years after a first offense.166  Determining the risk that a given person 
will commit another crime is a challenging task.  Many laws require 
the effort,167 however, and the Department of Justice has even 
mandated that one company refuse to hire any applicant with a 
“felony, theft, or larceny conviction within the applicant’s lifetime which 
resulted in an active prison or jail sentence” as part of a settlement.168 
The third Green factor is “the nature of the job” held or sought.169  
 
 163  EEOC Enforcement Guidance No. 915.002, supra note 5, at V.B.6.b. 
 164  Id. 
 165  PATRICK A. LANGAN & DAVID J. LEVIN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T 
OF JUSTICE, RECIDIVISM OF PRISONERS RELEASED IN 1994, at 1 (2002).  
 166  See Bushway, Nieuwbeerta & Blokland supra note 2, at 33 (“Offenders do 
eventually look like non-offenders, usually after a spell of between 7 and 10 years of 
nonoffending.”); see also “Redemption” in an Era of Widespread Criminal Background 
Checks, supra note 2, at 13 (reporting that, after 7.7 years, a person arrested at 18 for 
robbery, who has no further arrests, is no less likely to commit another crime than 
someone in the general population).  These studies measure recidivism by 
subsequent arrests (not convictions), an issue that may call into questions consistency 
with other positions the EEOC takes on arrests as a standard.  Id. at 14.  
 167  See, e.g., 12 U.S.C.A. § 1829 (2013) (restricting persons convicted of any 
criminal offense involving dishonesty or breach of trust or money laundering from 
owning, controlling, or participating in the conduct of the affairs of an FDIC insured 
institution); 42 U.S.C. § 13041 (2006) (“Each agency of the Federal Government, 
and every facility operated by the Federal Government (or operated under contract 
with the Federal Government), that hires (or contracts for hire) individuals involved 
with the provision to children under the age of 18 of child care services shall assure 
that all existing and newly hired employees undergo a criminal history background 
check.”); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 110-90.2 (2012) (requiring criminal history checks for 
child care providers); 24 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 1-111 (2012) (“Administrators of public and 
private schools, intermediate units and area vocational-technical schools shall require 
prospective employees to submit with their employment application . . . a report of 
criminal history record information from the Pennsylvania State Police or a 
statement from the Pennsylvania State Police that the State Police central repository 
contains no such information relating to that person.”). 
 168  EEOC v. Carolina Freight Carriers Corp., 723 F. Supp. 734, 738 (S.D. Fla. 
1989) (emphasis added). 
 169  Green v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 549 F.2d 1158, 1160 (8th Cir. 1977) (internal 
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This factor, like the first factor, correlates to Butts’ consideration 
about the “nature and seriousness of the crime in relation to the job 
sought.”170  An inquiry into the nature of the job encompasses the 
job’s title, its duties, its essential functions, the physical environment 
in which the job is performed, and the circumstances under which it 
is performed, including the level of supervision, oversight, and 
interaction with co-workers or vulnerable individuals.171  This factor 
helps link “the criminal conduct to the essential functions of the 
position . . . [to] assist an employer in demonstrating that its policy or 
practice is job related and consistent with business necessity.”172 
None of the three Green factors appear in Title VII, which is 
unsurprising because they are derived from an Equal Protection case 
and because it was not the focus of Congress when it passed or 
amended Title VII to create protection for voluntary conduct that 
results in a conviction for a crime.173  The Supreme Court has never 
had occasion to approve the Green factors, and in 2007, the Third 
Circuit did not apply the Green factors in deciding El.174  Moreover, 
these factors protect only Blacks, Hispanics, and other minority 
groups that have been discriminated against in the past.  A white 
person would not have been able to present a prima facie case based 
on the facts of Green.175 
C. The Individualized Assessment 
The 2012 Guidance would require an employer to first consider 
the three Green factors and then to conduct an individualized 
assessment for the African American or Hispanic candidate.  To 
conduct an individualized assessment, an employer must: (1) 
“inform[] the individual that he may be excluded because of past 
criminal conduct,” (2) “provide[] an opportunity to the individual to 
demonstrate that the exclusion does not properly apply to him,” and 
(3) “consider[] whether the individual’s additional information 
shows that the policy as applied is not job related and consistent with 
 
quotation marks omitted). 
 170  Butts v. Nichols, 381 F. Supp. 573, 580–81 (S.D. Ia. 1974). 
 171  EEOC Enforcement Guidance No. 915.002, supra note 5, at V.B.6.c. 
 172  Id. 
 173  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006). 
 174  El v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 479 F.3d 232, 244 (3d Cir. 2007). 
 175  This may prove troublesome over time as the Supreme Court ultimately takes 
up this issue.  At least one justice has expressed reservations about the 
constitutionality of the disparate impact theory overall.  See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 
U.S. 557, 595–96 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring).  
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business necessity.”176  The individualized assessment may include 
information regarding his misidentification, mitigating facts or 
circumstances, his age at the time of the conviction, the number of 
offenses, evidence of rehabilitation, his employment history, 
references, and bond status.177 
D. Less Discriminatory Alternative 
Even if an employer demonstrates that its policy is job related 
and consistent with business necessity, whether by a validity study or a 
consideration of the Green factors coupled with an individualized 
assessment, the Guidance holds that the EEOC may still find 
reasonable cause to believe a Title VII violation has occurred if it 
believes that there was a less discriminatory alternative employment 
practice, which the employer did not adopt but which serves the 
employer’s legitimate goals as effectively as the challenged practice.178  
Factors such as the cost or burdens of a proposed alternative are 
relevant in determining whether the alternative would be “equally as 
effective as the challenged practice in serving the employer’s 
legitimate business goals.”179 
V. THE FLAWS OF THE 2012 GUIDANCE 
Title VII declares that “[i]t shall be an unlawful employment 
practice for an employer to hire or to discharge any individual, or 
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his 
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, 
because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin.”180  The Civil Rights Act of 1991 codified disparate impact 
theory, allowing a claim under Title VII when the plaintiff 
“demonstrates that a respondent uses a particular employment 
practice that causes a disparate impact on the basis of race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin and the respondent fails to 
demonstrate that the challenged practice is job related for the 
position in question and consistent with business necessity . . . .”181  
Thus, to state a disparate impact claim, a plaintiff must prove that an 
employer’s practice truly causes a disparate impact based on one of 
the five protected immutable characteristics of an applicant, as 
 
 176  EEOC Enforcement Guidance No. 915.002, supra note 5, at V.B.9. 
 177  Id. 
 178  Id. at V.C.  
 179  Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 998 (1988). 
 180  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006). 
 181  § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i). 
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measured against the appropriate work force population.182 
A. The 2012 Guidance Is Based on Flawed Statistics 
The new EEOC Guidance represents an effort to advance a 
nationwide policy for something that is inherently local.  Disparate 
impact plaintiffs must show that a specific practice produces a 
disparate impact in the “relevant labor market.”183  Even though 
nationwide statistics may indicate that an employer’s policy has a 
discriminatory impact, a plaintiff cannot succeed without statistics 
tailored to the relevant market.184  Thus, proof that African Americans 
in the nation have criminal records at a higher rate overall does not, 
in itself, show that a criminal record exclusion policy has a disparate 
impact on African Americans in Omaha, for example. 
The EEOC justifies its 2012 Guidance by citing nationwide 
statistics—namely that arrest and incarceration rates across the nation 
are generally much higher for African American men (one in three) 
and Hispanic men (one in six) than for White men (one in 
seventeen).185  Yet such statistics vary from state to state and, perhaps 
more significantly, from crime to crime. 
1. Variations Based on State 
After accounting for population, the Black-to-White ratio rate of 
incarceration per 100,000 people ranges from a high of 19.0 to 1.0 in 
the District of Columbia to a low of 1.9 to 1.0 in Hawaii.186  Along with 
the District of Columbia, four states have a ratio at or above 12.0 to 
1.0.187  In contrast, five states have a ratio at or below 4.0 to 1.0.188  No 
state has a ratio in which Blacks fare better than Whites, although 
data from New Mexico and Wyoming are unavailable.189  For 
Hispanics, however, the incarceration rates vary even more 
substantially.  After accounting for population, the Hispanic-to-White 
ratio rate of incarceration per 100,000 people ranges from a high of 
 
 182  Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 650–51. 
 183  See cases cited supra note 83.  
 184  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(i)(1)(A)(i) (2006); Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 
490 U.S. 642, 650–51 (1989). 
 185  EEOC Enforcement Guidance No. 915.002, supra note 5. 
 186  Marc Mauer & Ryan S. King, Uneven Justice: State Rates of Incarceration by Race 
and Ethnicity, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, at 11, tbl. 6 (2007).  The statistics illustrate 
regional disparities.  Id. at 7.  While the national black-to-white ratio of incarceration 
is 5.6, it varies greatly among the states.  Id. at 10.   
 187  Those states are Iowa, Vermont, New Jersey, and Connecticut.  Id.  
 188  Those states are Arkansas, Alabama, Mississippi, Georgia, and Hawaii.  Id. 
 189  Id. 
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6.6 to 1.0 in Connecticut to a low of 0.4 to 1.0 in Hawaii.190  Only 
three states have a ratio at or above 5.0 to 1.0.191  In nine states, 
Hispanics are actually less likely to be incarcerated than Whites are, 
even after accounting for the size difference in population.192  An 
additional eleven states have a ratio between 1.3 to 1.0 and 1.1 to 1.0, 
making Hispanics only slightly more likely to be incarcerated than 
Whites are.193  Data from eleven states are unavailable.194  Significantly, 
these statistics do not account for differences by crime type. 
After generalizing from national statistics, however, the 2012 
Guidance instructs district directors to find a violation of Title VII 
when an employment policy excludes a minority applicant, triggering 
an automatic shift in the burden to the employer to prove job 
relatedness and consistency with business necessity.195  This cannot be 
the law.  A Hawaiian Hispanic should not be able to bring a disparate 
impact claim against a Hawaiian employer for the consideration of 
conviction records because in Hawaii, Hispanics are not adversely 
affected by such employment policies.  Whites are actually more likely 
to have been incarcerated than Hispanics in Hawaii.196  Similarly, 
while Blacks in every state are more likely than Whites to be 
incarcerated, there may very well be certain counties in which Blacks 
fare better than Whites, as Hispanics fare better than Whites in 
certain states. 
2. Variations Based on Crime 
Even allowing for the limited purposes of the Guidance, its focus 
on generalized statistics of incarceration takes inadequate notice of 
the likelihood that employers’ decisions do not range so broadly.  As 
the district judge found in Fletcher, the relevant inquiry is whether a 
decision was based on a specific criminal history that required a 
specific risk decision by the employer, not a probe into the general 
statistical presence of crime in society at large.197  It may be that, if the 
plaintiff in that case had been convicted of a different crime not 
 
 190  Mauer & King, supra note 186, at 14, tbl. 8. 
 191  Those states are Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania.  Id. 
 192  Those states are Nevada, Michigan, Georgia, Alaska, Florida, Arkansas, West 
Virginia, Louisiana, and Hawaii. Mauer & King, supra note 186, at 14, tbl. 8.   
 193  Those states are Kentucky, Washington, Indiana, Texas, Virginia, Mississippi, 
Missouri, Tennessee, South Carolina, Oregon, and Oklahoma.  Id. 
 194  Those states are Alabama, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, New Mexico, 
North Carolina, South Dakota, Vermont, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.  Id. 
 195  EEOC Enforcement Guidance No. 915.002, supra note 5, at V.B. 
 196  See Mauer & King, supra note 186 at tbl. 8. 
 197  Fletcher, 537 F. Supp. 2d at 1030. 
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involving sexual assault, the employer would have regarded it as less 
risky to employ him, or the court may have found that the decision 
was not tailored appropriately to the firm’s “legitimate business 
objectives.”  That court, however, made clear that close scrutiny of 
those statistics reveals more appropriate models for statistical analysis 
than the general incarceration rates across the nation. 
In sweeping all crime or incarceration statistics into every 
employer’s decision-making, the 2012 Guidance does not consider 
the fact that there are crimes that present specific risks and there are 
crimes that may be more prevalent in one segment of society than in 
others.  For instance, nationwide, 45.3% of all Americans who 
committed homicide from 1980 to 2008 were White, whereas 52.5% 
were Black.198  With respect to workplace-related homicides in that 
same period, however, 70.8% of offenders were White, whereas 
25.8% were Black.199  Even more skewed are the statistics showing that 
White offenders committed 84% of homicides involving White 
victims, while Black offenders committed 93% of homicides involving 
Black victims.200 
Other crimes exhibit similarly significant differences.  For 
example, in 2006, far more stalking offenders were White than 
Black.201  From 1993 to 2002, 21% of carjackers were White, whereas 
56% of carjackers were Black.202  In 2002, 64.9% of defendants 
convicted of intellectual property theft were White, whereas 6.1% 
were Black.203  From 1993 to 1999, Whites committed 54.7% of violent 
victimizations in the workplace (defined as rape, sexual assault, 
robbery, aggravated assault, and simple assault, but not homicide), 
whereas Blacks committed 30.2%.204  In 2010, 68.9% of larceny-theft 
offenders were White, whereas 28.3% were Black.205  In 2010, 85.7% 
 
 198  ALEXIA COOPER & ERICA L. SMITH, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NCJ 236018, 
HOMICIDE TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1980–2008, at 3, tbl. 1 (2011).  
 199  Id. at 12, tbl. 7. 
 200  Id. at 13. 
 201  See KATRINA BAUM, SHANNAN CATALANO & MICHAEL RAND, BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS, NCJ 224527, STALKING VICTIMIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES, at 12, app’x 
tbl. 2 (2009) (providing the raw numbers necessary to calculate the rates).  Stalking 
is “primarily intraracial in nature.”  Id. at 4. 
 202  PATSY KLAUS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NCJ 205123, CARJACKING, 1993–
2002, at 1 (2004). 
 203  MARK MOTIVANS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NCJ 205800, INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY THEFT, 2002, at 5, tbl. 3 (2004). 
 204  DETIS T. DUHART, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NCJ 190076, VIOLENCE IN THE 
WORKPLACE, 1993–99, at 1, 7, tbl. 13 (2001). 
 205  FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES, 2010, TBL. 43A, 
available at http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2010/crime-in-
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of driving while under the influence offenders were White, whereas 
only 11.5% were Black.206  This kind of variance may be why the court 
in Fletcher v. Berkowitz Oliver required that the plaintiff produce 
statistics to show that Blacks are more likely to be sex offenders 
specifically, rather than felons generally.207 
If a trucking company enacted a policy to refuse to hire any 
trucker who has had a DUI conviction, then no racial minority should 
be able to prove a disparate impact case against that employer 
because the policy does not actually create a disparate impact, even 
though the 2012 Guidance would presume a disparate impact from 
its reference to general national statistics.  Just as a plaintiff cannot 
rely upon nationwide incarceration statistics, the plaintiff also cannot 
rely upon general incarceration statistics. 
B. Statistics Do Not Show the Full Story 
Contrary to popular wisdom, data from a study by Professors 
Harry Holzer, Steven Raphael, and Michael Stoll show that employers 
who do check backgrounds are significantly more likely to hire 
minorities with convictions than those who do not check 
backgrounds.208  Because nationwide statistics show that, as a whole, 
African Americans are more likely to be incarcerated than Whites, 
this research might seem counterintuitive.  But what it seems to 
demonstrate is that background checks dispel what otherwise might 
be automatic stereotypes.  Examining a job applicant’s background 
seems to avoid this stereotyping characterization.209 
Employers may believe that arrest and incarceration rates are 
much higher for African American men than for other 
demographics, and conducting a background check appears to 
improve the prospect of hiring for Black males.  Employers, however, 
will not have perfect information about individual applicants and 
employees.  Employers care greatly about whether their employees 
have criminal records because they need to trust their employees, 
and they want to avoid harm to customers and other employees—
harm which a jury may find to have been foreseeable.  Checking 
backgrounds may override false assumptions that are especially likely 
 
the-u.s.-2010/tables/table-43/10tbl43a.xls.   
 206  Id. 
 207  Fletcher v. Berkowitz Oliver Williams Shaw & Eisenbrandt, LLP, 537 F. Supp. 
2d 1028, 1030 (W.D. Mo. 2008). 
 208  Holzer, supra note 1, at 458. 
 209  Id.  This study was not cited in the EEOC Guidance.   
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if job applicants have unexplained gaps on their resumes.210  Thus, if 
employers check to determine whether their applicants have criminal 
records, they are more likely to hire African American applicants.211 
If screening for criminal convictions actually makes African 
Americans more likely to be hired, the EEOC approach has extended 
beyond its statutory mission to eliminate racial discrimination.212  
That mission is to end discrimination based on an “individual’s race, 
color, religion, sex, or national origin.”213  Screening for criminal 
convictions may actually advance that mission, and creating a new 
theory of discrimination is a task for Congress, not an enforcement 
agency. 
It remains to be answered why the EEOC ignored the evidence 
that these background checks advance its objectives.  Either the 
EEOC: (1) disputes the validity of these statistics; (2) is unaware of 
these statistics; or (3) has given itself a new mission to help convicted 
criminals find employment.  Of these three possibilities, there is no 
evidence that the first one is correct.  Nowhere in the EEOC 
Guidance does the EEOC discuss these statistics; instead, it assumes 
that, because “African Americans and Hispanics are arrested at a rate 
that is 2 to 3 times their proportion of the general population,” 
screening for criminal convictions will have an adverse impact by 
race.214 
This lends some credence to the second possibility: perhaps the 
EEOC is simply unaware that African Americans are more likely to be 
hired when employers consider conviction records.215  “[T]he EEOC 
gets deference in accordance with the thoroughness of its research 
and the persuasiveness of its reasoning,” however, and ignoring that 
research may be fatal to any effort to persuade the courts to accept 
this interpretation of Title VII.216  If the EEOC is unaware of these 
statistics, then the agency has not been as thorough with its research 
as it should be. 
Perhaps instead the third possibility is correct, and the EEOC 
has embarked upon a new mission to help convicted criminals who 
are African American or Hispanic to find employment.  The EEOC 
convened on July 26, 2011 “to Examine Arrest and Conviction 
 
 210  Id. at 458–59. 
 211  Id. at 474. 
 212  Id. at 451.  
 213  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006). 
 214  See EEOC Enforcement Guidance No. 915.002, supra note 5, at II. 
 215  The 2012 Guidance does not cite to the Holzer, Raphael, Stoll article. 
 216  El v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 479 F.3d 232, 244 (3d Cir. 2007). 
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Records as a Hiring Barrier.”  At this meeting, the commissioners 
invited various speakers to testify and thus influence what would 
become the 2012 Guidance.  Professor Stephen Saltzburg testified 
about the “hidden world of punishment” and the difficulty that 
offenders have in finding employment.217  Saltzburg lamented that 
these offenders were trapped in a vicious cycle because a significant 
predictor of recidivism is whether an ex-convict finds employment.218  
The EEOC also heard from the President and Chief Executive Officer 
of D.C. Central Kitchen, who expressed his concern about the 
economic aspect of employing people with a criminal history—the 
cost of offenders returning to jail and the need to pay for jail 
amenities, as well as the lost benefit to the economy of taxes and 
wages from the employment of ex-offenders.219  The other speakers at 
the meeting also spoke to the importance of reemploying ex-convicts 
in general; they typically were not focused on the impact on racial 
minorities of the consideration of criminal records. 
The EEOC appears to be on a mission to reduce recidivism by 
attacking the perceived barrier to employment it believes background 
checks represent, but in doing so, it has ignored evidence that 
employment after release does not seem to have an impact on 
recidivism.220  Employing former offenders may be a socially 
important goal, but compelling employers to abandon their risk 
management is neither within the EEOC’s statutory authority nor 
apparently effective for the announced purpose of the initiative.  
Title VII prohibits employers from adopting policies that have a 
disparate impact by “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”221  
“Criminal status” is not yet a protected class.222  Perhaps Congress will 
enact greater protections for returning offenders—indeed, this is one 
of President Obama’s stated goals223—but it is not the EEOC’s 
mission. 
 
 217  Stephen Saltzburg, Professor, George Washington Univ. Law School, Written 
Testimony for EEOC Meeting (July 26, 2011), available at 
http://www1.eeoc.gov/eeoc/meetings/7-26-11/saltzburg.cfm. 
 218  Id. 
 219  Michael F. Curtin, Jr., President & CEO, D.C. Cent. Kitchen, Written 
Testimony for EEOC Meeting (July 26, 2011), available at 
http://www1.eeoc.gov/eeoc/meetings/7-26-11/curtin.cfm. 
 220  It is also not at all clear that there is a connection between post release 
employment and a reduction of recidivism.  Marilyn Moses, Ex-Offender Job Placement 
Programs Do Not Reduce Recidivism, CORRECTIONS TODAY, Aug./Sept. 2012, at 106–08.  
 221  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006). 
 222  See id. 
 223  Blumstein & Nakamura, supra note 28, at 10. 
CONNOR & WHITE (DO NOT DELETE) 6/7/2013  10:08 AM 
1002 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:971 
C. The Green Factors’ Imperfect Fit with the Risk of Recidivism 
In adopting the three Green factors, the EEOC has acknowledged 
concerns from employers that an applicant or employee will 
recidivate and cause harm.224  Unfortunately, predictions of 
redemption and desistence are academic projections and are 
uncertain reeds on which to lean in making practical risk decisions.  
Some studies show that at some time between seven and ten years 
after a first offense, a statistical offender who has not been arrested 
again will present no greater risk of future criminal involvement than 
does the general population.225  These studies are based on limited 
data.226  Obviously, an employer cannot predict with certainty whether 
a given job applicant will later commit a crime against it or a 
customer or fellow employee.  It can only try to make an educated 
evaluation on limited information. 
These recidivism studies are problematic for the EEOC 
Guidance because they show that the rate of recidivism is more 
closely tied to factors other than merely the three Green factors, even 
as enhanced by the 2012 Guidance.  After all, resuming criminal 
activity is an act of the will, and there are more factors that may 
significantly predict recidivism than the EEOC has either considered 
or mentioned in its Guidance.  The Florida Department of 
Corrections commissioned a study released in July 2003 to identify 
the factors that bore a significant relationship to recidivism in former 
prisoners.227  A partial list of factors that have been found to be 
statistically significant for recidivism includes: 
 race 
 Hispanic ethnicity 
 age at release from incarceration 
 post-release supervision 
 time spent in prison 
 disciplinary reports in prison 
 education level and 
 
 224  EEOC Enforcement Guidance, supra note 5, at III. 
 225  See supra note 165. 
 226  For example, they generally measure indications of recidivism from later 
arrests, not convictions, an issue on which EEOC and the courts may have further 
concerns.  See Blumstein & Nakamura, supra note 28, at 14. 
 227  FLA. DEP’T OF CORRS., RESULTS: FACTORS AFFECTING RECIDIVISM RATES (2003), 
available at http://www.dc.state.fl.us/pub/recidivism/2003/results.html; see also 
PATRICK A. LANGAN & DAVID J. LEVIN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, RECIDIVISM OF PRISONERS RELEASED IN 1994 (2002), available at 
http://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/rpr94.pdf. 
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 prior recidivism 
Among these, the Guidance would acknowledge only age and 
prior conviction history as factors the employer might properly 
consider in making an “individualized assessment” of the fitness of 
the candidate.  Risk assessment is a complicated and uncertain 
process.  It involves many interacting factors.  But this list strongly 
suggests that an employer who “treats” applicants similarly in making 
these decisions regardless of race should not be held liable for the 
“impact” of those decisions.  No better case could be made for 
confining claims of discrimination in the use of criminal background 
checks to the disparate treatment theory of proof than the simple fact 
that “race” is a statistically significant predictor of recidivism. 
The list indicates that an African American or a Hispanic with a 
prior conviction or someone who has had significant disciplinary 
reports in prison, minimal education, and prior recidivism is 
significantly more likely to make the decision to commit a crime 
again, leading then to an analysis of whether African Americans or 
Hispanics are disproportionately represented in any of these groups.  
On this list, the EEOC recognizes only age at release as a significant 
factor that should be considered in making a risk assessment.  There 
may be many reasons for these statistically significant associations.  
But ultimately, anyone who decides to commit a crime is likely to 
experience the stigma associated with that choice.  That stigma may 
be a disadvantage to him when compared to those who did not make 
the same choice.  It is also possible that those who make those 
choices will present more often to potential employers as risky hires 
than will those who have not made that election.  In those cases, so 
long at is that decision, and not race, that causes him disadvantage, 
Title VII does not protect him. 
This puts the problem of considering this employment practice 
statistically against the pool of convicted offenders in the entire 
United States in perspective.  Criminal conduct is a product of choice 
and is not an immutable characteristic of anyone’s race or ethnicity.  
Therefore, it should not be measured as if it were like an agility test 
or an educational qualification that can be validated.  Free choices 
made by individuals may have consequences, but as long as those 
consequences apply similarly among protected groups, Title VII does 
not reach them. 
D. What is “Business Necessity”? 
Even if the EEOC or private plaintiffs were successful in 
developing a proper statistical case of adverse impact in these cases, it 
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is not at all clear that the courts will require the level of proof the 
2012 Guidance urges to establish “business necessity” as they have 
defined it in this context. 
There is nothing in the case law that would suggest a validation 
under the Uniform Guidelines will be required to prove that failing 
to hire someone convicted of theft has the criterion, content or 
construct validity of a paper and pencil test for firefighters.228  The 
decision on this issue turns on the employer’s sense of risk to its 
business or to its visitors, customers, and other employees.  The 
employer may make its determination based on risk to the employer, 
such as the risk Judge Gonzales found present in Carolina Freight, 
where, for example, “the honesty of a prospective employee [was] 
certainly a vital consideration in the hiring decision.”229  In contrast to 
all the processes the 2012 Guidance urges on employers seeking to 
show the “business necessity” of their risk management decisions, the 
courts have recognized that there are other legal obligations to be 
discharged that may not lend themselves to precise analysis.  The 
courts’ decisions to date on this issue indicate that they are likely to 
continue to defer to the good faith decisions of employers that 
advance their legitimate business objectives, so long as the standard 
applies equally among protected categories of applicants. 
In any event, the Guidance does not take account of these 
decisions in its analysis justifying the EEOC’s interpretation of the 
law, and this is a weakness of the approach that may deny it favorable 
judicial deference.230 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The creative use of government power to remedy discrimination 
against any group is one of the great accomplishments of the 20th 
Century, and addressing problems in the judicial system that may 
cause imbalance between the races is an appropriate matter for the 
legislative and judicial branches today.  But Congress has vested the 
EEOC with specified powers to address particular forms of 
discrimination under Title VII.  As the enforcement agency, it is 
entitled to the deference that comes with fair interpretations of the 
law and appropriate analysis supporting those interpretations.  The 
2012 Guidance is not such a case.  To the extent that the Commission 
has ignored data and studies that do not comport with its extra-
 
 228  See supra note 145. 
 229  See EEOC v. Carolina Freight Carriers Corp., 723 F. Supp. 734, 753 (S.D. Fla. 
1989). 
 230  El v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 479 F.3d 232, 244 (3d Cir. 2007). 
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curricular purpose of addressing recidivism at large, it has taken on 
the role assigned to Congress under the Constitution. 
 
